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Abstract
The goal of homomorphic encryption is to en-
crypt data such that another party can operate
on it without being explicitly exposed to the
content of the original data. We introduce an
idea for a privacy-preserving transformation
on natural language data, inspired by homo-
morphic encryption. Our primary tool is ob-
fuscation, relying on the properties of natural
language. Specifically, a given text is obfus-
cated using a neural model that aims to pre-
serve the syntactic relationships of the original
sentence so that the obfuscated sentence can be
parsed instead of the original one. The model
works at the word level, and learns to obfus-
cate each word separately by changing it into
a new word that has a similar syntactic role.
The text encrypted by our model leads to bet-
ter performance on three syntactic parsers (two
dependency and one constituency parsers) in
comparison to a strong random baseline. The
substituted words have similar syntactic prop-
erties, but different semantic content, com-
pared to the original words.
1 Introduction
We consider the case in which there is a powerful
server with NLP technology deployed on it, and
a set of clients who would like to access it to get
output resulting from input text taken from prob-
lems such as syntactic parsing, semantic parsing
and machine translation. In such a case, the server
models may have been trained on large amounts of
data, yielding models that cannot be deployed on
the client machines either for efficiency or licens-
ing reasons. We ask the following question: how
can we use the NLP server models while minimis-
ing the exposure of the server to the original text?
Can we exploit the fact we work with natural lan-
guage data to reduce such exposure?
∗ Work done at the University of Edinburgh.
S
NP
PN
John
Paul
VP
V
phoned
scared
NP
D
the
the
N
terrorists
children
Figure 1: An example of a sentence (words on top) and
an obfuscated version of the sentence (words at bot-
tom), both having identical syntactic structure. The ob-
fuscated sentence hides the identity of the person who
performs the action and the action itself.
Conventional encryption schemes, including
public-key cryptography which is the one widely
used across the internet, are not sufficient to an-
swer this question. They encrypt the input text be-
fore it is transferred to the server side. However,
once the server decrypts the text, it has full access
to it. This might be unacceptable in such cases
where the server itself is not necessarily trustwor-
thy.
The cryptography community posed a similar
question much earlier, in the 1970s (Rivest et al.,
1978) with partial resolutions proposed to solve it
in later research (Sander et al., 1999; Boneh et al.,
2005; Ishai and Paskin, 2007). These solutions al-
low the server to perform computations directly
on encrypted data to get the desired output with-
out ever decrypting the data. This cryptographic
protocol is known as homomorphic encryption,
where a client encrypts a message, then sends it to
a server which performs potentially computation-
ally intensive operations and returns a new data,
still encrypted, which only the client can decipher.
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All of this is done without the server itself ever be-
ing exposed to the actual content of the encrypted
input data. While solutions for generic homomor-
phic encryption have been discovered, they are ei-
ther computationally inefficient (Gentry, 2010) or
have strong limitations in regards to the depth and
complexity of computation they permit (Bos et al.,
2013).
In this paper, we consider a softer version of ho-
momorphic encryption in the form of obfuscation
for natural language. Our goal is to identify an
efficient function that stochastically transforms a
given natural language input (such as a sentence)
into another input which can be further fed into
an NLP server. The altered input has to preserve
intra-text relationships that exist in the original
sentence such that the NLP server, depending on
the task at hand, can be successfully applied on
the transformed data. There should be then a sim-
ple transformation that maps the output on the ob-
fuscated data into a valid, accurate output for the
original input. In addition, the altered input should
hide the private semantic content of the original
data.
This idea is demonstrated in Figure 1. The task
at hand is syntactic parsing. We transform the
input sentence John phoned the terrorists to the
sentence Paul scared the children – both of which
yield identical phrase-structure trees. In this case,
the named entity John is hidden, and so are his
actions. In the rest of the paper, we focus on this
problem for dependency and constituency parsing.
We consider a neural model of obfuscation that
operates at the word level. We assume access
to the parser at training time: the model learns
how to substitute words in the sentence with other
words (in a stochastic manner) while maintaining
the highest possible parsing accuracy. This learn-
ing task is framed as a latent-variable modelling
problem where the obfuscated words are treated
as latent. Direct optimization of this model turns
out to be intractable, so we use continuous relax-
ations (Jang et al., 2016; Maddison et al., 2016) to
avoid explicit marginalization.
Our experimental results demonstrate that the
neural model performs better than a strong
random-based baseline (in which a word is substi-
tuted randomly with another word). We vary the
subset of words that are hidden and observe that
the higher the obfuscation rate of the words, the
harder it becomes for the parser to retain its accu-
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Figure 2: General setting illustration. An NLP client
encrypts an x into y through obfuscation and y is sent
to an NLP server. The NLP server (potentially even a
legacy one) does not need to be modified to deobfus-
cate y. An eavesdropper only has access to y which
is needed to be deobfuscated to gain any information
about x.
racy. Degradation is especially pronounced with
the random baseline and is less severe with our
neural model. The improved results for the neural
obfuscator come at a small cost to the accuracy of
the attacker aimed at recovering the original obfus-
cated words. We also observe that the neural ob-
fuscator is effective when different parsers or even
different syntactic formalisms are used in training
and test time. This relaxes the assumption that the
obfuscator needs to have access to the NLP server
at training time. Our results also suggest that the
neural model tends to replace words with ones that
have similar syntactic properties.
2 Homomorphic Obfuscation of Text
Our problem formulation is rather simple, demon-
strated in generality in Figure 2. Let T be some
natural language task, such as syntactic parsing,
where X is the input space and Z is the output
space. Let fT : X → Z be a trained decoder that
maps x to its corresponding structure according
to T . Note that f is trained as usual on labeled
data. Given a sentence x = x1 · · ·xn, we aim
to learn a function that stochastically transforms x
into y = y1 · · · yn such that fT (x) is close, if not
identical, to fT (y), or at the very least, we would
like to be able to recover fT (x) from fT (y) using
a simple transformation.
To ground this in an example, consider the case
in which T is the problem of dependency parsing
and Z is the set of dependency trees. If we trans-
form a sentence x to y in such a way that it pre-
serves the syntactic relationship between the in-
dexed words in the sentences, then we can expect
to easily recover the dependency tree for x from a
dependency tree for y.
Note that we would also want to stochastically
transform x into a y in such a way that it is hard
to recover a certain type of information in x from
y (otherwise, we could just set y ← x). Further-
more, we are interested in hiding information such
as named entities or even nouns and verbs. In our
formulation, we also assume that the sentence x
comes with a function t(x) that maps each token in
the sentence with its corresponding part-of-speech
tag (predicted using a POS tagger).
3 Neural Obfuscation Model
In this section we describe the neural model used
to obfuscate the sentence.
3.1 The Main Model
Our model operates by transforming a subset of
the words in the sentence into new words. Each of
these words is separately transformed in a way that
maintains the sentence length after the transforma-
tion. Let x be the original sentence x = x1 · · ·xn
and let y be the output, y = y1 · · · yn. From a
high-level point of view, we have a conditional
model:
p(y | x, θ) =
n∏
i=1
p(yi | x, θ). (1)
The selection of words to obfuscate depends
on their part of speech (POS) tags – only words
that are associated with specific POS tags from
the set P are obfuscated under our model. Let
ti be the POS tag of the ith word in the sen-
tence.3 In our basic model, we apply a bidirec-
tional Long Short-Term Memory network (BiL-
STM; Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997) to the
sentence to get a latent representation hi for each
word xi (see Section 3.2). We assume conditional
independence between x1 · · ·xi−1xi+1 · · ·xn and
yi given hi (which is a function of x), and as such,
our probability distribution p(yi | x, θ) is given
by:
p(yi = y |xi, hi, θ) =
1 ti /∈ P, y = xi
py ti ∈ P, y ∈ Vti \ {xi}
0 otherwise.
(2)
Here, Vti is the set of word types appearing at least
once with tag ti in the training set, and py is pre-
dicted with a softmax function, relying on the BiL-
STM state hi. More specifically, we define py as
follows:
py =
exp(w>ti,yhi)∑
y′∈Vti ,y′ 6=xi exp(w
>
ti,y′hi)
,
where wt,x ∈ R1024 is a tag-specific vector of
parameters associated with all the words for tag
t. Note that the above probability distribution
never transforms a word xi to an identical word
if ti ∈ P . This is a hard constraint in our model.
3.2 Embedding the Sentence
The BiLSTM that encodes the sentence requires
an embedding per word, which we create as fol-
lows. We first map each token xi to three embed-
ding channels eki , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The first channel
is a randomly initialised embedding for each part-
of-speech tag. Its dimension is 100. The second
channel is a pre-trained GloVe embedding for the
corresponding token. Finally, e3i is a character-
level word embedding (Kim et al., 2016) which
first maps each character of the word into an em-
bedding vector of dimension 100 and then uses
unidimensional convolution over the concatena-
tion of the embedding vectors of each character.
Finally, max-pooling is applied to obtain a single
feature. This process is repeated with 100 convo-
lutional kernels so that e3i ∈ R100.
The three embedding channels {e1i , e2i , e3i } are
then concatenated and used in the biLSTM en-
coder. We use a three-layer BiLSTM with
Bayesian dropout (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016).
The hidden state dimensionality is 512 for each
direction.
4 Training
In our experiments, we focus on obfuscation for
the goal of syntactic parsing. We assume the ex-
istence of a conditional parsing model p0(z | x)
where z is a parse tree and x is a sentence. This
is the base model which is trained offline, and
to which we have read-only access and cannot
change its parameters. As we will see in experi-
ments, the obfuscator can be trained using a dif-
ferent parser from the one used at test time (i.e.
from the one hosted at the NLP server).
Let (x(1), z(1)), . . . , (x(1), z(n)) be a set of
training examples which consists of sentences
and their corresponding parse trees. Considering
Eq. 1, we would be interested in maximizing the
following log-likelihood objective with respect to
θ:
L0 =
n∑
i=1
log
∑
y
p(y | x(i), θ)p0(z(i) | y).
This objective maximizes the log-likelihood of
the parsing model with respect to the obfuscation
model. Maximizing the objective L0 is intractable
due to summation over all possible obfuscations.
We use Jensen’s inequality1 to lower-bound the
cost function L0 by the following objective:
L =
n∑
i=1
∑
y
p(y | x(i), θ) log p0(z(i) | y)
=
n∑
i=1
Ep(·|x(i),θ)
[
log p0(z
(i) | y)
]
.
Intuitively, the objective function maximizes
the accuracy of an existing parser while using as
an input the sentences after their transformation.
Note that the accuracy is measured with respect to
the gold-standard dependency parse.2 This is pos-
sible because the sentence length of the original
sentence and the obfuscated sentence is identical,
and the mapping between the words in each ver-
sion of the sentence is bijective.
To make our substitution model have higher
stochasticity, we also tried including an entropy
term that is maximized with respect to θ in the fol-
lowing form:
Hi(θ, λ) = −λ
∑
y
p(y | x(i), θ) log p(y | x(i), θ).
1Jensen’s inequality states that for a non-negative ran-
dom variable Z and its probability distribution q it holds that
log(Eq[Z]) ≥ Eq(logZ).
2In principle, we may not need access to gold-standard
annotation when training the obfuscator. Instead, we could
train the model to agree with the parser predictions for the
original sentence, i.e. z(i) = argmaxz p0(z|x(i)).
However, in our final experiments we omitted that
term because (a) it did not seem to affect the model
stochasticity in a significant form; (b) the perfor-
mance has become very sensitive to the entropy
weight λ.
While we can estimate the objective L using
sampling, we cannot differentiate through samples
to estimate the gradients with respect to the obfus-
cator parameters θ. In order to ensure end-to-end
differentiabilty, we use a continuous relaxation,
the Gumbel-Softmax estimator (Jang et al., 2016;
Maddison et al., 2016), and the reparamterization
trick (Kingma and Welling, 2013; Rezende et al.,
2014).
More formally, the i-th token is represented by
the random variable with categorical probability
distribution Cat(pi) that has support Vti . To sam-
ple the word we first draw uk ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
and transform it to the Gumbel noise gk =
− log(− log(uk)), then we calculate
y′ = onehot
{
argmax
k∈Vti
[gk + log(pi,k)]
}
as the sampled discrete choice of substitution from
Vti and
yk =
exp ((gk + log(pi,k)/τ))∑
k′ exp
(
(gk′ + log(pi,k′)/τ)
)
as the “relaxed” differentiable proxy for this
choice, where τ denotes the temperature. When
it approaches 0, the vector (y1, . . . , y|Vti |) is close
to a one-hot vector sampled from the given cate-
gorical distribution.3
We use the Straight-Through version of the es-
timator (Bengio et al., 2013; Jang et al., 2016): the
discrete sampled choice is fed into the parser in the
forward computation but the relaxed differentiable
surrogate is used when computing partial deriva-
tives on the backward pass.
During the training of our neural model, the
parser only backpropagates the gradient from the
objective of maximizing the parsing accuracy (i.e.
minimum cross-entropy loss of the correct head
and label for each word), and hence it is always
fixed and is not updated during the optimisation.
5 Attacker Approaches
We test the efficiency of our obfuscation model
by developing two independent attacker models.
3In practice, we anneal the temperature from 1.0 to 0.5
over the course of training.
Their goal is to recover the original words by in-
specting only the obfuscated sentence. The at-
tacker models may have access to all data that the
parser and the obfuscator models were trained and
developed on. This is perhaps unlike other sce-
narios in which the training set is assumed to be
inaccessible to any attacker.
We note that ideally, we would want to show
that our obfuscation model retains privacy univer-
sally for any attacker. However, this is quite a dif-
ficult task, and we follow Coavoux et al. (2018) in
presenting two strong attackers which we believe
represent such universal attacker quite well.
In our attacker experiments, we assume that it is
not known which words in the sentence are obfus-
cated. As such, the results we provide for attack-
ing our obfuscation are an upper bound. In prac-
tice, an attacker would also have to identify which
words were substituted for new words, which may
lead to a small decrease in its accuracy.
5.1 Trained Attacker
Our first attacker works by first encoding the ob-
fuscated sentence with a BiLSTM network. We
then try to predict original words by using a feed-
forward neural network on each of the hidden
representations obtained from the encoder model.
The architecture is identical to that of the obfusca-
tion model (Section 3.1), with the only difference
that there is a softmax over the entire vocabulary
V instead of restricting it to Vti \ {xi}, as in Eq. 2.
5.2 Pretrained Attacker
In addition to a trained attacker, we also use a
conditional language model, BERT (Devlin et al.,
2018).4 BERT is based on the Transformer model
of Vaswani et al. (2017), and uses a bidirectional
encoder to obtain “contextual” embeddings for
each word in a given sentence. We use the BERT
model by masking out each obfuscated word, and
then predicting the masked word similar to the
“masked language task” that is mentioned by De-
vlin et al. (2018). This means that the embed-
dings in each position are fed into a softmax func-
tion to predict the missing word. We use the
bert-base-uncased model among the avail-
able BERT models.
We note that this attacker is not trained by us.
Its main weakness is that it is trained on the non-
4We use the implementation available at
https://github.com/huggingface/
pytorch-pretrained-BERT.
obfuscated text. However, its strength is that it is
trained on large amounts of data (we use the model
that is trained on 3.3 billion tokens). In addition,
in some settings that we consider the obfuscation
of the sentence is done in such a way that much
of the context by which we predict the obfuscated
word remains intact.
6 Experiments
In this section, we describe our experiments with
our obfuscation model. We first describe the ex-
perimental setting and then turn to the results.5
6.1 Experimental Setting
In our experiments, we test the obfuscation model
on two parsers. The first parser is used during the
training of our model. This is the bi-affine de-
pendency parser developed by Dozat and Manning
(2016). To test whether our obfuscation model
also generalizes to syntactic parsers that were not
used during its training, the constituency parser
that is included in the AllenNLP software package
(Gardner et al., 2018) was used.6
For our dependency parser, we follow the
canonical setting of using pre-trained word em-
bedding, 1D convolutional character level embed-
ding and POS tag embedding, each of 100 dimen-
sions as the input feature. We also use a three-
layer bi-directional LSTM with Bayesian dropout
(Gal and Ghahramani, 2016) as the encoder. We
use the bi-affine attention mechanism to obtain the
prediction for each head, and also the prediction
for the edge labels.
We use the Penn Treebank 3.0 (PTB; Marcus
et al. 1993) for training the dependency parser. We
follow the standard split for training (sections 01–
21), development (section 22) and test sets (sec-
tion 23). The training set portion of the PTB data
is also used to train our neural obfuscator model.
We also create a spectrum over the POS tags to
decide on the set P for each of our experiments
(see Section 3.1). This spectrum is described in
Table 1. Let the ith set in that table be Pi for
i ∈ [5]7. In our jth experiment, j ∈ [5], we ob-
fuscate the set P = ∪ji=1Pi. This spectrum of
POS tags describes a range from words that are
highly content-bearing for privacy concerns (such
5We will release the code and scripts for reproducing the
results.
6We used version 0.8.1.
7For an integer k, we denote by [k] the set {1, ..., k}.
i Category description Pi
1 Named entities NNP, NNPS
2 Nouns NN, NNS
3 Adjectives JJ, JJR, JJS
4 Verbs VB, VBN, VBD,
VBZ, VBP, VBG
5 Adverbs RB, RBR, RBS
Table 1: A scale of part-of-speech tags to obfuscate.
In the jth experiment, we set P = ∪ji=1Pi.
as named entities) to words that are less of a pri-
vacy concern (such as adverbs).
We compare our model against a baseline which
is found to be rather strong. With this baseline, a
word x with a tag t ∈ P is substituted with an-
other by a word that appeared with the same tag in
the training data from the set Vt. The substituted
words are uniformly sampled.
We evaluate the model through three different
principal metrics. The first metric is the accu-
racy of the parser (unlabeled or labeled, depend-
ing on the context), the second is the mean recip-
rocal rank (MRR) of the attacker on the relevant
method, and finally the ratio between the accuracy
of the parser and the accuracy of an attacker. The
latter metric provides a way to measure the amount
of accuracy we gain for each point of privacy we
lose, in the form of
accuracy
privacy
units.
With each of the attacker methods, we obtain a
distribution q over the possible true outputs recov-
ered from the obfuscated word. We use this distri-
bution to calculate the MRR, the average inverse
rank of the correct word according to this distribu-
tion. More precisely, the score we calculate is:
MRR =
100
N
N∑
i=1
1
ri
,
where ri ∈ N is the rank of the ith word (in the
whole corpus) according to q (the distribution over
possible output words for that word).
All neural experiments were run on a single
GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU. The time to run each
of the experiments was in the range of 13.3 hours
to 25.2 hours.
6.2 Results with Dependency Parsing
In our first set of experiments, we compare the
random substitution model to the neural model
of obfuscation on the dependency parsing model
that was used during training. As it is seen from
Table 2, both the neural model and the random
model, with their substitutions, do not signifi-
cantly harm the accuracy of the parser for the
first three experiments (corresponds to rows in the
table). However, as the number of obfuscated
words increases (with the categories of verbs and
adverbs), the accuracy of the parser significantly
drops. It drops much more significantly for the
random model compared to the neural model.
The attacker accuracy is in the range of the
20%–30% for all experiments. As expected, the
random model, given its inherent unpredictability,
makes it more difficult for the attacker to identify
the original words. However, the ratio between ac-
curacy and privacy often is better with the neural
model. In general, it also seems that the BERT at-
tacker gives similar results to the trained attacker
for the random baseline, and worse results with
the neural model. Finally, it is evident that as we
obfuscate more terms, the attacker’s accuracy de-
creases, with the BERT attacker consistently out-
performing the trained attacker.
We next turn to inspect the problem of depen-
dency parsing without a parser that was trained
with the neural obfuscation model (middle part of
Table 2). We see similar trends there as well, in
which the first three experiments give a reason-
able performance for both the neural and the ran-
dom model with a significant drop in performance
for the two experiments that follow. We also see
that the differences between the neural obfuscation
model and the random model are smaller (though
still significant), pointing to the importance of us-
ing the dependency model during the training of
the neural model.
6.3 Results with Constituency Parsing
Table 2 (bottom part) describes the results for con-
stituency parsing with the AllenNLP constituency
parser as described in Section 6.1. The results
point to a similar direction as was described for
dependency parsing. While the ratio between ac-
curacy and privacy is slightly better for the random
model, there is a significant drop in performance
for the fourth and fifth experiments when compar-
ing the random model to the neural model.
6.4 Analysis of Syntactic Preservation
Table 3 presents three sentences and their obfus-
cated versions both by the neural model and the
random model. In general, when we inspected the
Random (baseline) Neural model
Obf. terms trained BERT trained BERT
acc↑ prv↓ ratio↑ prv↓ ratio↑ acc↑ prv↓ ratio↑ prv↓ ratio↑
tr
ai
ne
d
de
p.
Named ent. 94.1/93.0 31.7 2.9 33.1 2.8 94.3/92.9 31.6 3.0 33.6 2.8
+Nouns 93.7/92.9 29.3 3.2 29.7 3.1 94.1/92.4 30.3 3.1 30.6 3.0
+Adjectives 93.1/92.4 28.1 3.3 27.7 3.3 93.6/91.7 29.5 3.2 29.9 3.1
+Verbs 80.4/85.2 31.9 2.5 19.8 4.0 87.3/78.7 34.7 2.5 21.9 4.0
+Adverbs 78.7/86.4 32.8 2.4 18.8 4.2 88.6/76.6 35.8 2.5 22.5 3.9
No obf. 95.0/93.5
A
lle
nN
L
P
de
p. Named ent. 91.9/89.7 31.7 2.9 33.1 2.8 92.2/90.1 31.6 2.9 33.6 2.7
+Nouns 91.5/89.2 29.3 3.1 29.7 3.0 91.5/89.4 30.3 3.0 30.6 3.0
+Adjectives 90.8/88.5 28.1 3.2 27.7 3.3 91.2/89.0 29.5 3.1 29.9 3.0
+Verbs 78.2/75.3 31.9 2.4 19.8 3.9 82.2/79.4 34.7 2.4 21.9 3.7
+Adverbs 76.7/73.5 32.8 2.3 18.8 4.1 82.0/78.9 35.8 2.3 22.5 3.7
No obf. 94.2/92.6
A
lle
nN
L
P
co
ns
t. Named ent. 92.4 31.7 2.9 33.1 2.8 92.5 31.6 2.9 33.6 2.7
+Nouns 88.2 29.3 3.0 29.7 3.0 89.0 30.3 2.9 30.6 2.9
+Adjectives 86.8 28.1 3.0 27.7 3.1 88.1 29.5 3.0 29.9 2.9
+Verbs 79.2 31.9 2.5 19.8 4.0 82.5 34.7 2.3 21.9 3.7
+Adverbs 76.8 32.8 2.3 18.8 4.0 79.5 35.8 2.2 22.5 3.5
No obf. 93.7
Table 2: Results of parsing accuracy and attacker accuracy for three different parsers. “acc” denotes accuracy
(Unlabeled Attachment Score/Labeled Attachment Score for the dependency parsers and F1 for the constituency
parsers), “prv” denotes the attacker accuracy (trained attacker and BERT attacker as described in Section 5.1 and
5.2) and “ratio” is the ratio between the parser accuracy and the attacker accuracy. Three parsers are considered:
a parser that participates in the obfuscation model optimization (top part), and offline-trained parsers from the
AllenNLP for dependency (middle part) and constituency parsing (bottom part). Two obfuscation models are
considered: neural (Section 3.1) and a random baseline. “No obf.” are parsing results without obfuscation. See
Table 1 for a description of each category of obfuscation terms.. Note that the categories are expanded in the
cumulative fashion: e.g., “+Adjectives” refers to the union of named entities, nouns and adjectives.
results for the two models, we found that the neu-
ral model tends to replace words by others that
have a functional syntactic role that is closer to the
original. For example, in the examples we present,
was is replaced with were and n’t is replaced with
not. The random model, however, does not ad-
here to any syntactic similarity between the origi-
nal word and its substituted version beyond them
having been seen in the training data with the same
part-of-speech tag.
To further test whether the neural model pre-
serves other syntactic similarities between the
original and obfuscated sentences, we took all
verbs from Propbank (Kingsbury and Palmer,
2002) and created a signature for each one: the list
of argument types it can appear with. For example,
the signature for yield is 01,012, which means that
“yield” appears with two frames in Propbank, one
with two arguments and the other with three argu-
ments. We then calculated for each verb that ap-
pears in the original sentence the overlap between
its signature and the signature of the verb in the ob-
fuscated sentence (neural or random). This over-
lap is counted as the size of the intersection of the
frame signatures of the two verbs.
There was a stark difference between the two
averages of the overlap sizes. For the random
baseline model, the average was 1.46 (over 5,680
tokens) and for the neural model the average was
1.80. The difference between these two averages
is statistically significant with p-value < 0.05 in a
one-sided t-test.
7 Related Work
There has been a significant increase in interest
in privacy issues in the NLP community in recent
years. For example, Reddy and Knight (2016) fo-
cused on obfuscation of gender features from so-
original I do n’t feel very ferocious .
random I liberalize Usually spin firsthand undistinguished .
neural I have not choose even Preliminary .
POS PRP VBP RB VB RB JJ .
original Individuals can always have their hands slapped .
random drugstores can secretly galvanize their persons hurt .
neural brokerages can even get their Outflows vetoed .
POS NNS MD RB VB PRP$ NNS VBN .
original Analysts do n’t see it that way .
random carpenters merge unilaterally undertake it that wind .
neural brokerages have not choose it that direction .
POS NNS VBP RB VB PRP DT NN .
original The device was replaced .
random The admiral echoed blunted .
neural The insulation were vetoed .
POS DT NN VBD VBN .
Table 3: Example of three sentences obfuscated with the random and neural models. Words in italics are the
ones being substituted (or the substitutes). The obfuscated terms are named entities, nouns, adjectives, verbs and
adverbs.
cial media text, while Li et al. (2018), Coavoux
et al. (2018) and Elazar and Goldberg (2018) fo-
cused on the removal of private information from
neural representations such as named entities and
demographic information. Unlike the latter work,
we are interested in privatising the inputs them-
selves, while requiring no extra work from de-
ployed NLP software which processes these in-
puts.
Another actively researched field is differen-
tial privacy (Dwork, 2008), which also regards
data privacy protection and data processing else-
where. The main purpose of differential privacy
is to enable distribution of the data as a training
dataset while at the same time protecting individ-
uals from being identified based on their records
in the dataset. There is also recent research that
brings differential privacy into natural language
processing such as (Fernandes et al., 2019), which
targets the removal of authorship identity using
differential privacy and the bag-of-words privacy
mechanism.
With homomorphic encryption long being an
important topic in cryptography, it has been bor-
rowed into the field of privacy-preservation in ma-
chine learning, particularly in terms of designing
neural networks which enable homomorphic op-
erations over encrypted data (Hesamifard et al.,
2017; Bourse et al., 2018). For example, Gilad-
Bachrach et al. (2016) designed a fully homo-
morphic encrypted convolutional neural network
that was able to solve the MNIST dataset with
practical efficiency and accuracy. However, since
the schema of direct homomorphic encryption is
not perfect, the constraint of multiplication depth
makes deep models intractable, and to the best of
our knowledge, no prior work has demonstrated
that homomorphic encryption could be directly
applied to the design of recurrent neural networks
or discrete tokens as input.
8 Conclusions
We presented a model and an empirical study
for obfuscating sentences so that the obfuscated
sentences transfer syntactic information from the
original sentence. Our neural model outperforms
in parsing accuracy a strong random baseline
when many of the words in the sentence are ob-
fuscated. In addition, the neural model tends to
replace words in the original sentence with words
which have the somewhat close syntactic function
to the original word.
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